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Working Longer,
Retiring Later
Are Employers Ready for the New Employment Trend?
Robert L. Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
Policy analysts, economists, and
demographers argue that individuals
must extend their work lives if they
are to achieve their desired standards
of living in retirement. Increases in
longevity imply that those who leave
the labor force at traditional retirement
ages must either save more during
their working careers or consume less
during their retirement.
The logic behind later retirement
from the employee’s perspective is
clear and has been studied in detail:
remaining in the labor force for
additional years is needed to support
increasing years in retirement.
However, relatively few studies have
directly addressed how employers
feel about having workers remain on
the job until older ages. Our book,
Extending Work Life: Can Employers
Adapt When Employees Want to Delay
Retirement?, which was recently
published by the Upjohn Institute
(see p. 7), seeks to fill this gap by
providing a comprehensive assessment
of the costs and benefits to employers
of accommodating later retirement
ages. Through their employment and
compensation policies, employers can
either assist or restrict workers’ ability
to remain on the job.
Economic theory of the firm
indicates that companies determine
the optimal number of workers to

hire and the appropriate age and skill
composition of their workforces. A
firm will need a mix of employees of
different skill types, skill levels, and
vintages of human capital. Changes in
the age structure of a firm’s workforce
due to delayed retirement can affect
labor costs, productivity, profitability,
and sustainability. Companies develop
their compensation policies to attract,
retain, motivate, and ultimately retire
their desired workforces. As a result,
shifts in worker preferences may lead
to changes in company policies.
Employers must consider the
advantages and costs of retaining
or hiring older workers. Older
workers often are relatively highly
compensated, and some will experience
diminished productivity at older ages.
Furthermore, as employers retain
older workers, the opportunities for
advancement by younger workers
might be restricted. Employers must
address the changing demographics
in their workforces. By creating
compensation and employment
policies to accommodate prolonged
or delayed retirement transitions,
employers will be better positioned to
reap the benefits of employing older
workers.
What factors influence a firm’s
willingness to retain older workers?
Can companies develop transitional

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Between 1994 and 2014, the labor force participation rate for men aged 65–69 rose
from 27 to 36 percent.
n By creating compensation and employment policies to accommodate prolonged or
delayed retirement transitions, employers will be better positioned to reap the benefits
of employing older workers.
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employment contracts so workers can
shift to new areas, perhaps with less
responsibility and lower compensation,
while remaining with their career
employers? While exploring the
bottlenecks and constraints that
might inhibit the development of
delayed retirement policies, our
book provides new insights into how
retirement transitions might develop
in the coming years and the potential
implications for legislative and
employer policies regarding retirement
ages.
Changing Patterns of Retirement
Throughout most of the twentieth
century, labor force participation
rates of older individuals steadily
declined as real income increased.
The establishment of Social Security
in 1935 promised workers a base
income in retirement. In the post–
World War II period, employers began
offering pension plans that provided
additional retirement income. As these
plans gained popularity, employers
developed pensions that provided
significant incentives for workers to
retire at or before age 65. Employers
encouraging retirement at relatively
young ages was the result of a rapidly
growing population that enabled firms
to hire younger workers at lower wages.
Increases in educational attainment
and the emergence of new technologies
reduced the competitive advantage of
experience. Thus, changing economic
and demographic conditions provided
the impetus for employers to develop
employment and compensation
policies that encouraged retirement at
specific ages.
In the past twenty-five years, there
have been substantial changes in the
proportion of older persons in the
labor force. As Figure 1 shows, between
1994 and 2014 the largest changes
for men have been for individuals
aged 62 and older. The labor force
participation rate for men aged
62–64 increased from 45 to 56 percent
during this period, while the rate for
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men aged 65–69 rose from 27 to 36
percent. Participation rates for women
followed a similar pattern; however,
the increases were greater for younger
women. The proportion of women aged
55–59 who were in the labor force rose
from 59 to 66 percent, and the rate for
women aged 60–61 increased from 45
to 58 percent. These trends in increased
labor force participation are projected
to continue. That, combined with the
aging of the population, has resulted in
a more than doubling of the number of
workers aged 55 and older, from 15.5
million in 1994 to 33.9 million in 2014.
As workers seek to delay retirement,
firms must review their policies and
determine whether and how they will
accommodate later retirement.
Employer Concerns about
Delayed Retirement
The most important issue for
employers associated with delayed
retirement is the impact of an aging
labor force on productivity and labor
costs. Many employers believe that
at some point productivity begins

to decline. At the same time, wages
and salaries typically rise with years
on the job. The cost of employee
benefits—especially health insurance,
pension contributions, and paid time
off—also increases with age. Economic
theory indicates that when a worker’s
marginal productivity falls below the

Through their employment and
compensation policies, employers
can either assist or restrict workers’
ability to remain on the job.
marginal cost to the firm, then a firm
has an economic rationale to want this
employee to retire.
Pay scales and benefits help firms
attract the desired labor force and then
retain them. Companies also develop
policies to incentivize employees
to retire when it is optimal for the
employer. If workers do not retire
around these ages, the company will
be adversely affected. Thus, many
employers will resist later retirement

Figure 1 Labor Force Participation Rates for Men and Women Aged 55 and Older (%)
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because they believe it will lower
productivity, raise costs, and alter
the optimal age distribution of their
workforce.
Employer Policies for the Future
Assuming that employees will
continue to desire later retirement,
employers must decide how they will

Many employers will resist later
retirement because they believe
it will lower productivity, raise
costs, and alter the optimal age
distribution of their workforce.
respond. They may seek to develop
new compensation and employment
policies. They might find that, all else
equal, it is optimal to accommodate
workers’ preferences for working
longer by modifying job assignments
and compensation policies. However,
employers may also face barriers
when making adjustments to working
conditions and/or compensation, such
as union contracts, age discrimination
laws, tax law and pension regulations,
and production techniques.
In some settings, phased retirement
and return-to-work policies might
make sense to both employees and
employers. Many workers may prefer
restructured compensation while
remaining with their current employers
rather than retiring and seeking new
employment in a bridge job. Despite
this, the use of these policies in today’s
workforces is somewhat limited.
Employers may have informal policies
with the aim of keeping the best
workers but may be reluctant to have
a broad program that offers phased
retirement to all qualified employees.
Employers might also be reluctant to
adopt such policies for fear that they
might run afoul of federal and state age
discrimination policies.
It seems likely that firms will face
increasing demand from employees
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to delay retirement. New research is
needed to provide a better framework
in which to evaluate the impact of
this expected change on labor costs
and productivity. For example, would
individuals actually prefer a decreasing
wage profile at the end of a career prior
to complete retirement? Would this
type of contract be more appealing
if framed as a lifetime compensation
package rather than a decline in salary
at the end of career? The presence of
bridge jobs suggests that lower wages
and fewer hours are appealing to some
older workers.
In the longer term, if employers
accommodate later retirement, does
this lead to new types of employment
contracts? For example, if the incidence
of phased retirement increases,
then we might expect adjustments
in employment contracts that precommit workers to lower salaries
and/or benefits at older ages. Do
employers find it more efficient to
set up formal policies regarding
retirement transitions, such as phased
retirement options or return-towork postretirement? If so, are tax
policies and government-provided
retirement benefits designed optimally
to allow for new types of employment
relationships? What new types of
employment contracts are currently
being introduced to accommodate
trends toward working longer?
If working longer is deemed to be
beneficial for individuals, society, and
the economy, legislative policies could
be adopted to increase incentives for
individuals to remain in the labor
force and for firms to employ older
workers. Policymakers could identify
and remove any real or perceived age
discrimination issues associated with
phased retirement programs. This
would signal the benefit of modifying
working conditions and compensation
policies to ensure employing older
workers is cost-effective. Redesigned
jobs and reduced working hours,
combined with access to retirement
benefits when entering phased

retirement, could make employees
more willing to leave full-time
employment and accept these new
conditions.
Much of this analysis focuses on
the impact of delayed retirement on
individual employers, holding constant
market forces. In many aspects, this is
how a firm would view these changes.
However, demographic changes and
any ensuing macroeconomic shifts
will alter the labor market over time.
For example, downward pressure
on market wages will increase the
willingness of firms to accommodate
preferences for older retirement ages.
Extending Worklife outlines how
individual employers might view
sudden changes in the retirement ages
of their workforce. We emphasize how
the push toward delayed retirement
might not be desirable to individual
employers. We speculate that as
individuals choose to delay retirement,
firms will respond by trying to form
new types of employment contracts
more suited to the preferences of older
workers and consistent with their
changing value to firms.
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